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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Justin Hoskins appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence
discovered during a search of a cigarette pack, after the police officer directed him to place the
cigarette pack in a vehicle that was about to searched. The district court concluded that because
the vehicle search was conducted pursuant to the valid consent of the vehicle’s owner, Mr.
Hoskins lacked standing to contest the search. On appeal, Mr. Hoskins argues, as he did in the
district court, that because the cigarette pack was only in the vehicle because the police officer
had directed him to leave it there, the item was not lawfully subject to the vehicle search under
this Court’s holding in State v. Newsom, 132 Idaho 698 (1998).

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The following facts were established at the suppression hearing. On September 24, 2016,
Idaho State Trooper Spenser Knudsen stopped the gold Pontiac Grand Am in which Mr. Hoskins
was riding, based its cracked windshield. (R., p.122.) There were three occupants in the car:
Jovette Archuleta was the driver; Amber Alvarez, the owner of the vehicle, was riding as a
passenger in the front seat; and Mr. Hoskins was in the backseat. (R., pp.22-23; Tr., p.15, L.3 –
p.16, L.4; Exhibit A.) 1 The officer spoke to the occupants, obtained identification documents
from all three of them, and requested registration and insurance information for the vehicle.
(R., p.122.) The occupants were unable to produce a registration or proof of insurance for the
vehicle, and the officer learned from the dispatch operator that the license plates did not return to
the Pontiac Grand Am, but to a different vehicle; he also learned the occupants had prior drug
convictions. (R., p.123; Tr., p.18, L.23 – p.19, L.3.)

1

The officer had the driver exit the vehicle and stand in front of his patrol car as he
questioned her about drugs and asked for consent to search the vehicle. (R., p.123.) The driver
informed the officer she was not the vehicle’s owner, and that he would have to ask Ms. Alvarez,
who was seated in the front passenger’s seat. (R., p.123.) The officer then looked through the
driver’s wallet finding upwards of three hundred dollars in cash. (Tr., p.32, Ls.16-18.)
The officer then asked the owner, Ms. Alvarez, to step out of the vehicle to talk with him;
he questioned Ms. Alvarez about her prior drug use and asked for her consent to search the car.
(R., p.132.) Ms. Alvarez expressed reluctance and concern, but ultimately gave the officer
consent to search the vehicle. (R., p.123.)
Once the officer obtained Ms. Alvarez’s consent to search the vehicle,2 he instructed
Mr. Hoskins to exit the vehicle, and specifically, to “leave your smokes and stuff right there on
the seat.” (R., p.123; Exhibit A, 4:31:15.) When Mr. Hoskins stepped out of the vehicle with his
wallet and opened cigarette pack in hand, the officer demanded, again, that he put the items back
inside the car. (Tr., p.28, Ls.9-14; Exhibit A, 4:31:15.)3 Mr. Hoskins acquiesced and placed the
items inside the vehicle. (Exhibit A., 4:31:20.) The officer then removed a pocket knife
Mr. Hoskins told him was in his pocket and placed it on the trunk of the car. (Tr., p.21, Ls1823.) During the subsequent search of the car and questioning of Mr. Hoskins, 4 the officer found

1

The audio and video recording of the encounter, taken from Officer Knudsen’s patrol vehicle’s
in-car camera, was admitted as Exhibit A. (Tr., p.56, Ls.9-10.)
2
By the time the officer asked to speak with Hoskins, two more officers arrived at the scene.
(Tr., p.17, Ls.1-2.)
3
The recording shows the officer stopped Mr. Hoskins as was stepping out of the car; the officer
bent down to point into the car, and abruptly stated, “hey, hey, hey [inaudible] your stuff right
there.” Officer Knudsen also testified that he saw the items in Mr. Hoskins’ hand, and when he
told him to put them down, Mr. Hoskins put them back on the seat where he was sitting.
(Tr., p.28, Ls.10-14).
4
At one point during the questioning, after Officer Knudsen had obtained Ms. Alvarez’s consent
to search, and after he had directed Mr. Hoskins to place the items on the car seat, Officer
2

marijuana in the cigarette pack Mr. Hoskins had placed in the car. (R., p.123; Exhibit A,
4:33:42.) At no time did Mr. Hoskins grant the officer permission to search the cigarette pack,
his wallet, or any of his belongings. (See generally Exhibit A.) Officer Knudsen walked back to
his patrol vehicle to write citations. (See Tr., p.44, Ls.2-5.)5 Upon closer inspection of the
cigarette pack, however, he discovered a baggie containing methamphetamine. (R., p.124.)
Based upon that evidence, Mr. Hoskins was arrested and the State charged him with possession
of methamphetamine. (R., pp.9, 124.)
Mr. Hoskins filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search
violated his Idaho and United States constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures. (R., p.66.) He specifically claimed that his rights were violated because the officer
instructed him to place his wallet and personal items inside of the vehicle to be searched, citing
State v. Newsom, 132 Idaho 698 (1998). (Tr., p.60, Ls.1-7; R., p.67.) At the suppression
hearing, the State called State Trooper Knudson, and the district court admitted the recording of
the encounter. (Exhibit A; Tr., p.56, L.4.) The parties submitted written briefs at the district
court’s request. (Tr., p.56, Ls.15-19; R., pp.82, 98.)
The district court denied the motion, issuing a memorandum decision and order.
(R., p.122.) The district court ruled that the officer’s initial stop and prolonged detention were
constitutionally reasonable, and that the officer had obtained valid consent from the owner to
search the vehicle. (R., pp.124, 125, 129.) Without addressing Mr. Hoskins’ argument under

Knudsen asks Mr. Hoskins “what am I going to find” inside the car when he searches it, and
Mr. Hoskins responds that there is marijuana in the cigarette pack. (Exhibit A, 4:33:30.) The
State presented no argument in the district court, nor did the district court find, that this comment
provided justification for the search.
5
Throughout the encounter, the officer repeatedly told the passengers he was going to issue
citations for the violations, even after learning about the marijuana. (See Tr., p.44, Ls.2-5.)
3

Newsom, the district court concluded that the search was conducted pursuant to the consent of
the vehicle’s owner, and that Mr. Hoskins therefore lacked standing to challenge the search.
(R., p.130.)
Mr. Hoskins entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance,
reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. (R., p.142;
Tr., p.70, Ls.9-12.) The court sentenced Mr. Hoskins to three years, with one year fixed, and
suspended that sentence and place him on probation. (R., p.171.) Mr. Hoskins timely appealed.
(R., p.165.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hoskins’ motion to suppress evidence?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It denied Mr. Hoskins’ Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
The district court erred when it denied Mr. Hoskins’ motion to suppress. The district

court erroneously ruled that Mr. Hoskins lacked standing to contest the search of the personal
items he was instructed to place in the car, and it failed to address Mr. Hoskins’ argument under
State v. Newsom, 132 Idaho 698, 700 (1998). In Newsom, this Court held that “the police cannot
create a right to search a container by placing it within the passenger compartment of a car or by
ordering someone else to place it there for them.” 132 Idaho at 700. But that is precisely what
the police officer did here. After obtaining the owner’s consent to search the vehicle, Officer
Knudsen demanded that Mr. Hoskins exit the car and leave his wallet and “smokes” on the seat.
As in Newsom, the container was only in the vehicle because Officer Knudsen had directed him
to leave it there. See id. Mr. Hoskins’ attempt to retain his property as he exited the vehicle
made it clear that the scope of the owner’s consent to search did not extend to those items, even
if Officer Knudsen was justified in having Mr. Hoskins’ leave them in the vehicle “for officer
safety.” Since the cigarette pack was only in the vehicle because the officer ordered Mr. Hoskins
to place it there, the district court erred in concluding it was subject to owner’s consent to search
the vehicle. The district court’s denial of his motion to suppress should be reversed.

B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing a trial court’s order granting or denying a defendant’s motion to

suppress, this Court defers to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009). Factual findings supported by substantial and
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competent evidence are not clearly erroneous. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 659 (2007).
“Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to be given to conflicting evidence, and
factual inferences to be drawn are also within the discretion of the trial court.” Bishop, 146
Idaho at 804. However, this Court maintains free review over whether the facts surrounding the
search and seizure satisfy constitutional requirements. Henage, 143 Idaho at 658.

C.

The State Failed To Carry Its Burden Of Demonstrating That The Warrantless Search Of
Mr. Hoskins’ Cigarette Pack Was Constitutionally Reasonable
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”

U.S. Const. amend IV.

Evidence obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment

protections is subject to the exclusionary rule, which requires the suppression of both primary
evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, and evidence later discovered
and found to be derivative of an illegality, that is, “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988-98 (1992).
Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable, and therefore, violative of the
Fourth Amendment. See State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642, 647 (2017). The State may overcome this
presumption by demonstrating that a warrantless search fell within one of the specifically
designated and well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id.
In this case, the only justification for the search offered by the State, and addressed by the
district court, was the consent to search granted by the vehicle’s driver, Ms. Alvarez. As
discussed below, the owner’s consent did not extend to the items that Mr. Hoskins was ordered
to place in the vehicle. The holding in Newsom prohibited the officer from creating a right to
search by ordering that Mr. Hoskins place his property back in the car. Because the officer
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searched Mr. Hoskins’ personal items with no right to do so, in violation of Mr. Hoskins Fourth
Amendment rights, Mr. Hoskins has standing to challenge that search.

1.

The District Court Erred In Ruling Mr. Hoskins Lacked Standing To Contest The
Search Of The Personal Items He Had Placed In The Vehicle At The Police
Officer’s Direction

The district court erroneously concluded Mr. Hoskins lacked standing to contest the
search of the cigarette pack he was directed to place in the vehicle. Suppression may be obtained
by those whose rights are infringed; when a search is challenged, the defendant must make “a
threshold showing that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or thing searched.”
State v. Hansen, 142 Idaho 711, 715 (App. 2006) (quoting Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,
104 (1980) (emphasis added).
A passenger with no possessory interest in a vehicle that is subject to an allegedly illegal
search generally lacks standing to object to the search of the vehicle, since the passenger lacks an
expectation of privacy in the vehicle. See, e.g., State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 10 (Ct. App.
2009) (a passenger cannot not assert the driver’s rights). Mr. Hoskins claims no possessory right
in the vehicle that was searched, but he plainly has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his
wallet and his cigarette pack that he was ordered to place in vehicle. The wallet and the cigarette
pack were personal items typically kept with or on the individual who owns them; the undisputed
evidence was that Mr. Hoskins kept these personal items next to him in the car (he was the only
passenger in the backseat), and he was carrying both of them in his hand when Officer Knudsen
instructed him to place them in the car. (Exhibit A, 4:31:15; Tr., p.28, Ls.9-14.) He did not
abandon nor voluntarily leave these items in the vehicle. State v. Greub, 162 Idaho 581, 587
(Ct. App. 2017) (an occupant’s acquiescence to an officer’s demand to leave her purse in the
vehicle does not render that act “voluntary”).
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Accordingly, Mr. Hoskins had and retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in those
items. See State v. Westlake, 158 Idaho 817, 823 (Ct. App. 2015) (“personal effects” are
expressly protected from unreasonable search and seizure by the Fourth Amendment”); see also
United States v. Craddock, 841 F.3d 756 (8th Cir. 2016) (“there is an expectation of privacy in
the items carried on one’s person”). Therefore, Mr. Hoskins had standing to contest the search
of the items, and the district court’s conclusion to the contrary was in error.

2.

Under This Court’s Holding In Newsom, Mr. Hoskins’ Personal Items Were Not
Lawfully Subject To The Search Of The Vehicle

In State v. Newsom, this Court decided that the police may not create a right to search a
container by placing it within the passenger compartment of a car, or by ordering someone else
to place it there for them. 132 Idaho 698, 700 (1998). In that case, the passenger had her purse
in her lap when she was asked by the police to exit the vehicle. Id, at 699. She began to get out
of the vehicle while holding her purse, but an officer ordered her to leave the purse in the car. Id.
When the driver was arrested and officers searched the vehicle incident to that arrest, they also
searched the passenger’s purse, finding methamphetamine.

The district court denied the

passenger’s motion to suppress, concluding that the purse was lawfully subject to the search of
the vehicle incident to arrest. Id. This Court reversed, holding that the passenger’s purse “was
entitled to as much privacy and freedom from search and seizure as the passenger herself”; since
the purse was only in the vehicle because the officer ordered her to leave it there, the purse was
not subject to the search incident to arrest. Id., at 700.
In State v. Holland, the Court explained Newsom’s holding:
Newsom stands for the proposition that the police cannot create a right to search a
container by placing it within the passenger compartment of a car or by ordering
someone else to place it there for them.
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135 Idaho 159, 163 (2000). In Holland, this Court held that the passenger had voluntarily left
her purse in the vehicle when she exited, whereas the passenger in Newsom had been directed to
place her purse in the vehicle to be searched. 135 Idaho at 163. Because the purse had been left
voluntarily, the Holland Court held it was a container within the passenger compartment of the
vehicle and lawfully subject to a search incident to the arrest of the driver. Id., at 163.
In State v. Frizzle, the Court of Appeals examined Newsom in the context of a search
conducted pursuant to a driver’s general consent to search a vehicle. 132 Idaho 522, 525 (Ct.
App. 1999). In Frizzle, the Court of Appeals observed that the passenger in Newsom had shown
ownership as well as an exercise of control over the purse, and had attempted to remove it when
she exited the vehicle. Id., at 525. By contrast, the facts in Frizzle contained no indication that
the item found in the car – a backpack – belonged to the passenger, nor did the passenger attempt
to exercise any control over it. Id. Additionally – and relevant to scope of vehicle search
authorized by its driver – the passenger in Frizzle expressed no desire to limit the scope of
driver’s consent to search. Id. Upon these facts, the Court of Appeals in Frizzle held the officer
had “reasonably relied” on the driver’s apparent authority to consent to the search of the vehicle
that included the passenger’s pack. Id.
Just like the passenger in Newsom, and unlike the passengers in Holland and Frizzle,
Mr. Hoskins claimed ownership and exercised control over his personal items; he removed them
from the vehicle – and thereby removed them from the scope of the search – but was directed by
the police to place the items back in the vehicle’s passenger compartment. Just like in Newsom,
the items were only in the vehicle because the officer ordered Mr. Hoskins to leave them there.
Newsom, 132 Idaho at 699; Mr. Hoskins did not leave them in the vehicle voluntarily.
Accordingly, the consent to search the vehicle granted by the owner did not extend to
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Mr. Hoskins’ cigarette pack or wallet, and those items were not subject to Ms. Alvarez’s waiver
of her rights and consent to search.

3.

The State Failed To Carry Its Burden Of Showing Ms. Alvarez Had
Authority To Consent To The Search Of Mr. Hoskins’ Cigarette Pack

When, as in this case, the State contends that the warrantless search was justified by
consent,6 the State bears the burden to demonstrate that the officer reasonably believed the
person giving the consent had actual or apparent authority to do so. State v. Westlake, 158 Idaho
817, 821-22 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990)). “Police
may not accept a consenter’s invitation to search if the circumstances are such that a reasonable
person would doubt the consenter’s authority.” Westlake, 158 Idaho at 822. If the officer lacks
an objectively reasonable basis to believe authority exists to search the place or object, the search
is impermissible. Id.
The facts in this case show Officer Knudsen had no reasonable basis to believe that
Ms. Alvarez had either actual or apparent authority over Mr. Hoskins’ cigarette pack.
Mr. Hoskins’ unequivocal conduct – claiming ownership, exercising possession, and removing
his cigarettes and wallet from the vehicle – conveyed to the officer that the cigarette pack and the
wallet belonged to Mr. Hoskins and not Ms. Alvarez, and those actions made it clear that the
Ms. Alvarez’s authority, and thus the scope of her consent to search, did not extend to those
objects. Given these undisputed facts, Officer Knudsen could not reasonably rely on the owner’s

6

The rational for a search justified by consent is significantly different from the rationale
permitting a search incident to arrest. An officer is justified in conducting a vehicle search
incident to an arrest, “because of the need to remove any weapons that the arrestee might seek to
use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape and the need to prevent the concealment or
destruction of evidence. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1963). A consent search is
not justified by the need to prevent loss of evidence.
11

consent to search Mr. Hoskins’ cigarette case. Compare State v. Frizzle, 132 Idaho 522, 525 (Ct.
App. 1999) (concluding that officer reasonably relied on driver’s general consent to search
vehicle, including passenger’s backpack, where passenger took no action to claim ownership or
control over the backpack, and made no effort to limit scope of driver’s consent search.)
The State failed to demonstrate that the search of Mr. Hoskins cigarette case, after he was
directed to place that item in the vehicle, was justified by the owner’s consent to search – which
was the sole justification offered for the search.

The district court’s decision to deny

Mr. Hoskins’ motion to suppress should therefore be reversed.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hoskins respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s denial of his
suppression motion, vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand the case to the district court
for further proceedings.
DATED this 17th day of January, 2018.

___________/s/______________
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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